Non-heterosexualites: Disabilities and BeyondPosted: November 12, 2012
Basic equality of humans does not make being crippled equal to being fully bipedal.
But, the state of being crippled is not itself a motive. To be motivated toward something that inherently causes oneself or others to become crippled is an aberrant motive. How crippled is too crippled to bear it? Is there no possible such thing as an aberrant sexual orientation? And, even assuming there is, is even it not a consequence of something committed in the past by someone else? And, if it is, how aberrant could that ‘something’ have been?
The only way same-sex marriage is a human right is if same-sex ‘coitus’ has no inherent epigenetically adverse consequences, at least not when compared to normal heterosexual…marriage.
And, unless it already scientifically is known that same-sex ‘coitus’ has no inherent comparitive epigenetically adverse consequences, then the jury is very much out as to whether same-sex marriage is a right of any kind. It is easy to agree with a smiling face and a civil manner. But, gambling borrowed genetic capital is bad enough as it is, because Mother Nature owns not only all possible capital but every possible gambling establishment. And, given Mom Nature’s normalization of heterosexuality as the only natural, and by far most efficient, means of ensuring the maintenance of Her investments, same-sex attraction at best borrows from the microbiology of the Her heterosexual hegemony.
In fact, it is the rare heterosexual who finds nothing remotely epigenetically wrong with the idea of him- or herself engaging in ‘coitus’ with persons of his or her own gender. And, such ‘coitus’ is what gay ‘marriage’ presupposes. So, if such ‘coitus’ is not a biological crime against the local biological ecology on which the biological health of a local community depends, then, at the very least, such ‘coitus’ is a kind of dead-end borrowing upon the only kind of society in which Mother Nature clearly prefers to invest all Her capital.
Moreover, sexual attraction for one’s own gender, rather than for the opposite gender, is the absence of the initial key factor for reproduction, and thus the absence of a key cohesive force of progenitive society. Short of external regulators informing the need for heterosexual mating behavior, a population consisting entirely of individuals who lack opposite-sex attraction would, at best, simply die off. In other words, imagine a functionally isolated population made up entirely of purely same-sex attracted persons, and imagine that none of those persons has any hint of the fact that humans have the power to procreate: such a population would, at best, simply die off if none of those persons ever was informed of that power nor of the means by which that power is exercised. By this account, moreover, if sexual attraction were likened to nutritional appetite, then same-sex-attraction would be like appetite for rocks instead of for food.
So, if, (and only if) there is any inherent progenitive shortfall in same-sex attraction, then there may be an even deeper, if more complex-and-subtle, inherent problem with same-sex ‘coitus’: it may strictly be genetically and epigenetically adverse. It may be a kind of gambling with borrowed biological capital, in which the capital is the microbiological health of heterosexuals, and thus of natural progenitive society. The gambling of that capital, as the act of homosexual ‘coitus’, is in face of the fact that Mother Nature owns the metals, the coin, the bank, and the casino. It is one thing to welcome gambling addicts as friends. It’s another to believe, for their smiling faces and confident manner, that they know what they’re doing with money.
Given that dimorphic social organisms are partly geared to reproducing themselves (namely by a sexual bond between the two forms), it seems to me obvious that the most straight-forward kind of perception-preference regarding the agency of reproduction among such organisms has the natural hegemony among such organisms. So, it seems to me that heterosexuality in humans is, if nothing else, the most cost-effective, and otherwise purpose-driven, human sexual orientation in terms of the reproduction of humans.
So, if ‘human civil rights’ is like Checkers, then the biological foundations of a sustainable society is like Chess. People are free to think Checkers is the most profound game, but they are not free to believe that Mother Nature thinks so. Despite their presumption that they are playing Her at Checkers, She may, in fact, be playing them at Chess. In other words, to think Mother Nature is just a ‘secular business woman’ with no political opinion is to think that the microbiological ecology on which our individual and collective health depends is essentially random. Relative to the congruent naivety, some corners seem far more justifiably cut than others. This is especially the case for those corners that, to those who are all-but-insensible to them, seem not to be there at all.
The full range and depth of worldly benefits for observing the humble sacred Truths always seem to eclipse those Truths. That’s how powerful the Truth is. That’s also how humble the Truth is.
The problem is when Truth’s humility is over-emphasized, or its power de-emphasized. Always this is done out of a secular ignorance of the form of the Truth, under the impression that the form is trivial, even unjust.
Of course, the form of Truth without the Truth is oppressive, to say the least. But, this in no way invalidates its form; it re-emphasizes it. The consummate marriage act has a form, and its form is inherently present with its truth. This, despite that that form can be so divorced from its truth as to make that form into one of the most unjust acts imaginable. So, it is admitted that such an unjust act, rather than invalidating the form, cannot help but re-emphasize the natural mutual necessity between that form and its original Truth.
What if one were born with that aberrant motive? Or, what if one were born with an uncommon vulnerability to acquiring that motive? Then one would be disabled.
But, in regard to some kinds of disability involving aberrant motives, to claim that that disability is equal to its congruent ability is, in effect, to claim that anyone who thinks that that disability is a disability is being bigoted. Worse, it is, in effect, to claim that that disability is superior to the congruent ability, since that disability tends to be accompanied by a greater willingness to ‘experiment’ outside its own sphere of ‘preference’.
Of course, sexual-diversity advocates don’t claim that homosexuality is a superior sexual orientation, since they don’t think it is more ‘adaptable’ than heterosexuality. They claim, rather, that homosexuality should be thought of by heterosexuals as principally undifferentiated from heterosexuality: that it doesn’t, or shouldn’t, matter what anyone’s sexual orientation is, including the full expression of that orientation.
But, if it shouldn’t matter what anyone’s sexual orientation is, then what about a human’s sexual orientation to non-human animals instead of to humans, or to that human’s biological parent or child? Does this sexual orientation make persons with this orientation more, or less, abled in constructive terms. Destructive ability is certainly an ability, and, so long as aberrance is a valid concept, there must logically be admitted to exist possible destructive abilities the possessors of which do not necessary perceive them as principally destructive, but may perceive them as principally constructive.
For example, assuming that some sex acts are aberrant, a person who genuinely has an aberrant sexual orientation (and principally no other sexual orientation) genuinely has that orientation. This is a trouble for everyone, including for that person. Among other things, that person may rationalize that anyone who finds that orientation aberrant is bigoted: that anyone who is repulsed by that orientation wants to take away their right to be sexual beings, to have sexual feelings, and to express those feelings.
So, aberrant ‘alternative’ sexual orientation must be framed either as a most tragic kind of disability, or as not a disability at all. If it really is a disability, then to frame it as not a disability is to allow, if not to force, a philosophical reframing of normal heterosexuality as the inferior sexuality (as less adaptable/less adapted/less willing to experiment with alternate sex acts). But, if aberrant ‘alternate’ sexualities are not a disability, then they are not really aberrant, which automatically reframes heterosexuality as inferior.
But, again, equality between the basic kinds of humans (male/female, black/white, introvert/extrovert, etc.) does not imply equality between ability and disability. So, the first question regarding pro-active non-heterosexual orientation (unlike a-sexuality, which, while a disability, is not aberrant) is whether there are any such orientations which properly are understood as disabilities (and thus as aberrant per their pro-active nature). The second question is whether all pro-active non-heterosexual orientations are properly so understood.
A principle tragedy of some of the most tragic kinds of disabilities is that persons with those disabilities are treated by normal persons in ways that are at odds with the well-being of those disabled persons. For example, many persons with autism are sometimes treated under the assumption that they have normal perceptual faculties and so whose actions are presumed principally to be motivated by the kinds of motives which a perceptually normal person would have to be motivated by in order to act that way.
But, if we wish to insist that born a-sexuality is not a disability, then at least we admit that it is the absence of a principal kind of motive for action in a progenitive society. Persons born genuinely lacking any sexual interest can no more feel prevented from acting sexual than can a person born fully blind feel prevented from painting en plein air. But, to be blind in a sighted world is to be prevented the fuller range of socially cohesive perceptions, so that to be especially socially inclined while blind is to feel some loss for being somewhat left out of all the social things that occur by way of sightedness.
But, blindness is not itself either an alternate perceptual motive nor an absence of other, normal perceptual motives: the perceptual hyper-lucidation of hearing, smell, touch, etc, which develops in persons deprived of sight does not socially repel sighted persons, but tends to socially compensate for the blindness.
But, the existence of automatically deeply socially compensatory disabilities such as blindness does not mean it is impossible for there to exist disabilities that lack much of such compensation. Being crippled is one example.
But, then, there are disabilities that have directly socially repelling features, including those caused by perceptual abnormalities rather than by a simple loss of some of the perceptual panoply (as in a-sexuality or blindness).
Given that dimorphic social organisms are partly geared to reproducing themselves (namely by a sexual bond between the two forms), it is obvious that the most straight-forward kind of perception regarding the agency of reproduction among such organisms has the natural hegemony on such perception. Heterosexuality in humans is, if nothing else, the most cost-effective, and otherwise purpose-driven, human sexual orientation in terms of the reproduction of humans.